The Journals of Ayn Rand Page 42

  The first step was Einstein’s equation on the conversion of matter into energy, which he formulated before the First War. After that, there was a long, progressive series of steps, achieved by single scientists working independently of one another all over the world. Quoting now merely from a newspaper account (this has to be checked by fuller research), the key steps seem to have been: the discovery of the neutron by Sir James Chadwick, in England, in 1932; the splitting of a uranium atom by Lise Meitner, Hahn and Strassman, in Germany, in 1939; the elaboration upon this experiment by Niels Bohr in Denmark and Enrico Fermi in Italy; the meeting of Bohr and Fermi in America in 1939, when the first discussion of the possibility of an atomic bomb was held; Fermi’s proposal to representatives of the Navy; the creation of the atomic bomb project; the two years of work there; the test in New Mexico; the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

  That, in a very general outline, is the story we have to tell. What is its significance? To whom does the credit for the atomic bomb belong?

  By the time Fermi approached the Navy with his proposal, the basic scientific work was done; scientists had discovered that the atom could be split and knew how to do it; what remained was the practical application, specifically to the purpose of a bomb. Who had given to the world the crucial basic knowledge? The single, voluntary, unplanned, unregulated efforts of individual scientists, each following his own line of research. Was it a “collective” achievement? No. They did not work together under a common plan, nor under directives, nor by majority vote. It was not the achievement of one individual—nor the achievement of an organized group. It was—as all civilization—the sum of free, individual efforts.

  I quote from Science and the Planned State: “We may turn to any part of science and we are likely to find the same thing: the fundamental discoveries are commonly made by single workers.”

  I quote from Einstein: “I am a horse for single harness, not cut out for tandem or teamwork.”

  Now we come to the last stage—the work on the atomic bomb project. That was an organized effort. Organized by whom? By one man or five men—we don’t know the number—but we know that work was done under the absolute guidance of a few top scientists. Was that a collectivist method of working? Well, the members of that “collective” didn’t even know what they were working on. There was no “democracy” about it, no majority vote, no “collective bargaining.” Shall we then consider it an example of Nazi methods—a small, ruling elite and a blindly obedient mass? No. Because none of those men was forced into that project.

  What was it then? Why, simply and exactly the same method as that of any large enterprise carried on by a free industrial concern. Any enterprise has to work under a single guidance—so long as it is one specific task. The employee in a private industry has to take orders from the boss, and cannot and must not vote upon the boss’s policy--or you get chaos; but beyond and outside the specific work which the employee has voluntarily undertaken to perform, the boss has no power over him; and within his particular task, an employee must be left free and must exercise his own effort to achieve results. Isn’t that the pattern of free industry? And isn’t that the way the work on the bomb project was done?

  A splendid example of cooperation and discipline? Of course. So is any Ford plant. The biggest and most successful examples of large-scale organization have always been American. Because this kind of cooperation is possible only among free men by voluntary agreement.

  Is that collectivism? No. Collectivism is compulsion. Compulsion and cooperation are not synonyms. They are opposites. Collectivism is group action by decree—and in matters where no group action is possible. Cooperation is a highly complex division of individual labor. Collectivism is not division, but herd action, in theory—and a gun stuck in your back in practice. You don’t cooperate at the point of a gun. Only free men can cooperate.

  This is the crucial difference between the method of free enterprise and the method of Statism. This is why one succeeds and the other fails. This is why the scientists could not work under dictatorships, but could work in America. This is why an organization such as the bomb project could not exist in Germany.

  We must keep this clearly in mind in order to show the real historical significance of these events. We must not get into a childish interpretation of secondary matters. We must not give the impression that the secrecy, the military discipline, the walled-in cities were responsible for the achievement. These things were required to protect a secret—not to solve it. They were necessities of wartime and of the fact that the work involved a military weapon. They were not necessities of scientific research. We must keep these two aspects clearly defined and apart.

  Now we come to the part played by the government. What was the most significant thing about it? The fact that the government did not attempt to run the bomb project. The government and the Army took orders from the scientists—not vice versa. The government provided the means—and let the scientists do the work as they wished. We must show this clearly.

  Otherwise, there is a great danger of the usual superficial interpretation. The audience will make a conclusion such as: “It was a government project, wasn’t it? And it turned out well, didn’t it? So government control is good.” It is by such crude, blanket conclusions and unanalyzed, unwarranted generalizations that all the errors in sociological thinking are made.

  The part played by the government in the bomb project is not the part people advocate when they speak of government control. A government project is run by the government. A private industry controlled by government takes orders from the government. This is the exact opposite of what happened on the bomb project. For once, the government literally acted as the servant of the people involved, not the master. The government put itself at the disposal of the scientists and carried out their wishes without questions. This is illustrated nicely in the little incident of General Marshall giving a $250,000 check to one of the scientists, without knowing or asking what it was for.

  This behavior of the government is highly commendable and if we present it exactly as it was, it will be the best compliment we can pay to the government in this case, and it should please every official involved. Do you think officials will be offended if we show that they acted as free men toward free men—and not as Gestapo agents or Commissars?

  This is a point that must be shown and stressed. It displays the contrast between a free country and a Statist dictatorship. Under a dictatorship, men would be forced into the project, assigned to it by command, frozen in their jobs, prohibited from leaving under penalty of death, and ordered to work. (And therefore no work would be done.) Materials would be confiscated. (And therefore there would be no materials.) The government would decide who does the work, where and how; there would be the usual unholy mess of directives, regulations, red tape, commands—and bloody purges to punish lack of progress, men executed in order to make the survivors work better through terror. (But achievements and creation are not done through terror.) There would be the usual inquisition on who belongs to what race and whose political beliefs are or are not in strict accordance with the official party line. Now are we still going to wonder why no achievements ever come out of dictatorships? Sheer accident?

  The atomic bomb was not a creation of government—but of the free cooperation of free men. And it is essential to show its whole history—from the single steps by single scientists—to their exiles and escapes—to their coming together for their last effort under the guidance of the best among them. We must not start the picture with the final stage, something like Roosevelt calling the scientists together and saying: “Boys, make me an atomic bomb.” That’s not the way it was done. If that were the way, Hitler would have done it.

  We must not fall into a naive Statism by featuring a government project and saying: “Government did it.” That would be equal in intelligence to a man who comes out of a movie theater, saying: “The theater owner is the one who created that wonderful movie. He provided the theater, didn’t he?”

  And while we show the part played by the government, with proper and exact credit—we must also show, with proper and exact credit, the part played by private industry. The tremendous material and technological resources that were required to make the atomic bomb came from and were created by private American industry, by free enterprise—and were not and could not be created anywhere else by any other method. Statist nations could not have manufactured the bomb, even if they had invented it. The atomic bomb was the end product of a huge, complex industrial structure made up of private achievements and ingenuity—a structure which Statism can neither accomplish nor copy. This must be said and shown.

  The plants built for the bomb project in Tennessee and in the state of Washington were built by the DuPont Company—“without profit and with a repudiation of all patent rights” (N.Y. Times). This must be shown. Patent rights mean that the DuPont Company had contributed some original inventions. This must be shown.

  In our handling of the public names and figures involved, we must maintain the strictest fairness, accuracy and impartiality. If we present Roosevelt in a favorable light, we must also present the DuPonts in a favorable light. Nobody will or can object, so long as what we present is factually true.

  In the manner and terms I have here described, the general tone of our picture will be that of a great tribute to America—an epic of the American spirit. We will not do it in any phony flag-waving way (we must never even say it nor make speeches about it); we will merely show the American method and its results. We will dramatize that which is the essence of America.

  An abstract, general theme of this nature will give deeper significance to the specific events we present, will lift the picture above the class of a documentary film of the moment
into that of a great historical work, and will give it the importance and the dignity which the subject demands.

  Our picture will say: “This is what America has done—she is the only one who could have done it—this is how and why she was able to do it.”

  If the above exposition does not represent your approach to the picture, I cannot permit myself to take upon my conscience the contribution of a single line to it.

  If you agree with this exposition and wish to make the picture on this basis—I shall consider it an honor and a privilege to work on the screenplay.

  January, 1946

  Theme

  The mind against brute force;

  therefore—

  The mind is that which cannot be forced and will always win against force;

  therefore—

  Freedom from compulsion;

  therefore—

  The methods of free enterprise against the methods of the totalitarian state.

  Show throughout that what applies to men applies in exactly the same way to states and nations. (Men are the atoms of society. Matter is organized according to the nature of atoms—not atoms according to what one would like to do with matter.)

  First part: scientists fight a lonely, losing battle as the world moves toward totalitarianism, the rule of force, the climax of which is Hitler.

  Second part: the world, lost in a chaos of brutality, has no recourse but to appeal to scientists (the mind) to save it from unleashed brutality.

  January, 1946

  [AR prepared the following list of questions for the first of two interviews she conducted with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who served as scientific director of the atomic bomb project at Los Alamos.]

  Questions for J. Robert Oppenheimer

  When did he start in Chicago? Summer, 1942.

  When in New Mexico? March, 1943.

  Who selected the scientists for New Mexico? How were they invited? What was their attitude? Incidents?

  How was the work done? To what extent [was it] controlled? To what extent [was it] free? If controlled—by whom? How many free, unexpected discoveries were there? How many men were responsible for crucial, basic points?

  Incidents to show progress of the work?

  Were there crucial turning points, i.e., milestones of the progress?

  What points or events stand out in your mind?

  Was there any one specific day or event when they knew they had it?

  Was there a specific event when they started manufacturing the actual bombs used?

  (Our picture is to be a tribute to the scientist—as a representative of free inquiry and the independent mind.)

  Contributions of industries?

  Incidents of German work on the atomic [bomb]? What happened to Otto Hahn? [Otto Hahn was a German chemist and physicist who received the Nobel prize in 1944 for splitting the uranium atom (1939). He collaborated with the Nazis in their effort to develop the atomic bomb.]

  Did scientists really fear German success and consider it a race—or were they contemptuous of the German efforts?

  What does he consider the best in people as demonstrated in connection with this project?

  What does he consider the worst?

  Any trouble or interference which he cares to mention?

  Incidents typical of the men as scientists?

  What does he consider his most important contribution to atomic physics—before the project?

  How was he picked to be head of Los Alamos—was he chosen or did he volunteer? When and how did he first hear about the project?

  January 8, 1946

  Notes from interview with J. R. Oppenheimer

  No theoretical problem. “Approved for destruction.” Some parts ready two years before.

  Scientists—[almost] no one turned him down. (One refused. Two quit the project.)

  Project had a bad name at the beginning.

  [Obstacles to hiring scientists:] 1. Scientists already employed.

  2. Project’s bad name.

  3. Remote location.

  4. Hated to work for Army.

  Town run by Army—commanding officer in charge.

  [Oppenheimer was] called by Dr. Arthur Compton in spring of 1942.

  Group came to Berkeley in summer of 1942.

  Staff of laboratory at maximum of 3,500—scientific staff about 900. In the last three years—scientific work at Los Alamos, production at the other two labs [located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanford, Washington].

  Early part—working out scientific schemes for the other two plants. Group at first meeting being told about work in single teams.

  All 900 knew the scientific principles—and others after six months residence were told what they were making.

  They kept it secret without rules—merely by making it a principle to keep it secret.

  Bohr was not closely associated—brought some slight information—not essential to work.

  Fermi contributed enormously.

  Scientific high points (prior to project):Rutherford—discovery of nucleus.

  Quantum theory.

  [James] Chadwick—discovery of neutron.

  Dr. Bush important, “had President’s ear.” [Dr. Vannevar Bush was director of the government’s Office of Scientific Research and Development. ]

  Refugee scientists responsible.

  Summer of 1942—decision to manufacture bomb was made. Theoretical work was done.

  Conant and Bush presented evidence to Roosevelt. [Dr. James B.

  Conant was chairman of the National Defense Research Council during World War II.]

  January 15, 1946

  Questions [for Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer]

  Describe typical day.

  How was work done? On assignment—or free investigation of assigned problems?

  When did he move to live in Los Alamos?

  Bodyguard?

  Theoretical scientist: Give one incident about himself prior to project. Incidents typical of the men as scientists?

  Control of Army?

  Hiroshima.

  Notes from [Second] Interview with Dr. Oppenheimer

  Seminars—free discussions (“give and take”).

  Tormented by something he can’t solve.

  Memories: Moral doubts.

  Bohr arrives at his house—evening, it is snowing. Went for walk. Talk about German work.

  About a year ago—terrible jam on equipment—working 24 hours a day—shop burned down—“evening of extreme [weather conditions]”—snow, inadequate water pressure.

  Three or four people at first (March, 1943)—cold—conferences in half-built rooms.

  Waiting for news of Nagasaki.

  Surprises—came out in conferences—about eight people talking. Trouble about freedom and getting their own personnel and supplies. Trouble with engineers who wanted to start building. First model of bomb had nothing in common with actual bomb.

  Scientists ran it—they decided what they needed.

  Formal parties—like Englishmen in the Congo.

  Hiroshima—Sunday at Los Alamos—brother called and they went for ride—took children to go swimming. Next morning he got phone call at lab—everything all right. On Tuesday night—a colloquium—800 scientists—worried that the next one might not work.

  Assembly of first bomb (Trinity). [This was the bomb used for the test in New Mexico.]

  Compton left—got scared—in early days.

  Bodyguard: Sentry at house—standing all night. One of two guys had to go out with him.

  Driver assigned to Compton.

  June 1943—guard assigned—couldn’t [leave] often.

  His achievements: Theory of cosmic ray particles—that neutron particles were cosmic rays—1936.

  Typical day: Talking with individuals about their problems; trying to give them a feeling of confidence; correcting them while making them think they did it themselves.

  Conferences: two on technical subjects, one on administration. One meeting a week to describe progress.